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Fractured Freedoms:
The United States’ Postmodern Approach to Protecting Privacy.
Adam G. Todd*

In literary scholarship, there are references to “the postmodern novel” and also references
to a particular poem or writing being labeled “postmodern.”1 Such a designation in literature is
rather commonplace but in law there appears to be no such use of the term “postmodern”.
Despite the growth in the “law and literature” movement, which examines the law as literature,2
laws are never described as being “postmodern.”3 There are, however, laws that do fit the
characteristics of postmodernism and can aptly be labeled “postmodern”. Privacy law in the
United States, much like a piece of postmodern literature, fits this label.
There are some individual pieces of legislation relating to privacy that, like a piece of
literature, can be labeled “postmodern; for example, the Financial Services Modernization Act4
or the United StatesEU Safe Harbor Agreement5 fit this label due to their postmodern traits. For
this paper, however, rather than examining one specific law, the sweeping area of the law
referred to in the United States as “privacy law” is examined. These laws cover a broad range of
*
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Kentucky University, USA. This paper is based on a presentation delivered at the Polish Association of American
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“Special Issue: Terrorism and the Postmodern Novel,” Studies in the Novel 36:3 (Fall 2004).
http://www.engl.unt.edu/sitn/currentissue3.htm (accessed October 31, 2004).
2
Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at Century’s End (New York: New York
University Press, 1995): 149166.
3
There are some Supreme Court decisions that have been described as “postmodern” and also postmodern
interpretative tools applied by scholars. See Stephen M. Feldman, “Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal
Scholarship and Judicial Practice (With an Emphasis on the Teague Rule against New Rules in Habeas Corpus
Cases),” 88 Northwestern University Law Review (1996): 166.
4
GrammLeachBliley Financial Services Modernization Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 68016809 (2000).
5
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issues ranging from video surveillance and wiretapping to abortion, gay marriage and Internet
security. This broad range of laws, like the more specific laws, demonstrate as a whole, the
characteristics of “postmodernism” and provide greater insight into the strengths and problems of
the United States’ approach to privacy protection.
Privacy law in the United States can be characterized as postmodern because it is fractured or
broken as a legal regime. But, paradoxically, there are strong arguments that its fractured
structure and other postmodern characteristics make it the appropriate form of law or legal
regime to regulate privacy in the postindustrial age. Its postmodern characteristics make it
suited to the rapidly changing technologies that affect privacy protection.
This paper tackles two subjects, two terms, that are very difficult to, and some would say
practically defy, definition: “privacy” and “postmodernism”. The term “privacy”, in American
law, is extremely unclear to the point of being amorphous. The term “postmodernism” is even
worse; it, arguably, cannot be defined. The term “postmodernism” is used here as a label,
specifically to identify products that maintain the attributes of postmodern philosophy; in other
words, products that reflect the rejection of modernism. United States privacy law can be
characterized as rejecting a modernist label (or not modern) because it is not strictly rational,
orderly, or capable of a single definition or explanation. It maintains postmodern traits such as
being fragmented, paradoxical, intertwined with high technology and mass consumerism.
Using postmodernism in legal scholarship often raises criticism. Many argue that
postmodernism’s state of flux and uncertainty is antithetical to the normative needs of the law.6
The very idea behind a modern, written law is to create certainty and clarity in our relations with

2000).
6
Minda, 208.

American Freedoms, American (Dis)Orders: Proceedings of the Polish Association of
American Studies 2004 Conference

3

others and the State.7 Labeling a law as “postmodern”, however, is useful for linking the
discourse between postmodern theory, our postindustrial, hightech age, and the modern,
normative needs of the law and lawyers and judges.
The label of “postmodernism” can be a liberating construction–one that allows for a bridge
between the rigidity and normalization of modernism and the fluidity and flux of postmodernism.
Postmodernism grants a license for flexibility and multiplicity in a discipline that is often rigid
and inflexible. It removes the necessity of privileging one position over another and can allow
multiple positions and interpretations to exist simultaneously. Identifying and labeling this
process in the law returns a certain form of normalization and “certainty” (at least certainty about
uncertainty) into the law. Postmodernism allows jurists to label and examine this broad and
chaotic area of the law and expose its strengths and weaknesses.
I focus on six broad characteristics that can be used to label a particular law or at least
privacy law as “postmodern.” These broad characterizations incorporate most if not all of the
characteristics and themes of postmodernism identified by scholars but simply under broader
categorizations8 A law can be considered postmodern if it: (1) lacks a clear definition, challenges
or lacks certainties, edifices and boundaries and, rejects master or metanarratives; (2) contains
paradox and irony; (3) emphasizes the social construction of the self as opposed to the
autonomous self; (4) is politically ambivalent (has radical implications, but it is also
conservative); (5) is intertwined with high technology such as the internet and consumer culture;
and (6) is grounded in consumerism and daily life.

7

Anthony Walsh and Craig Hemmens, From Law to Order: The Theory and Practice of Law and Justice (New
York: American Correctional Association, 2000).
8
Stephen M. Feldman, American Legal Thought from Premodernism to Postmodernism (New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2000): 162184.
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The first characteristic of American privacy law that makes it “postmodern” is that it
lacks a clear definition, certainty and boundaries, and is without clear foundation. The scholar
Hans Bertens identifies “ontological uncertainty” as a “central concept of postmodernism.”9
Privacy law in the United States, which regulates key protections of an American citizen’s
selfhood, is anything but certain; it lacks boundaries, has holes, and some even question whether
privacy still exists in the United States in such as way that it is worth having laws relating to
them.
The definition of privacy in the United States, at least in terms of the law, is considered
particularly elusive. There is no right to privacy clearly written in the United States Constitution.
Under the common law, privacy rights did not get much attention until 1890 when Louis
Brandeis wrote an influential article calling for privacy to be protected under American law.10
The formal “right to privacy” was not truly recognized by the United States Supreme Court until
the case Griswald v.Conneticut in 1965.11 In that case, the court found this right not directly in
the Constitution but in the (rather mysterious) penumbra or shadow of the rights found in the
United States Bill of Rights. Since the Griswald case, privacy has expanded and applies to a
wide range of cases in American law. As mentioned earlier, it applies to items such as whether
the police can search your car or ask your name, your right to die, use of marijuana for medical
purposes, abortion, workplace surveillance, internet commerce, credit checks, school grading
procedures, gun control, and meetings with the President or Vice President about energy policy
and national security.
9

Hans Bertens, “The Postmodern Weltaanschauung and its Relation with Modernism: An Introductory Survey.”
Approaching Postmodernism. Eds. Douwe Fokkema and Hans Bertens (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Co., 1986). 9
48. Reprinted in A Postmodern Reader. Eds. Joseph Natoli and Linda Hutcheon (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1993): 2570.
10
Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193220.
11
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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In academic circles, there is also no consensus on the role or function of privacy law. Some
see privacy law as protecting individual autonomy; others see it as protecting the right of self
definition; solitude and intimacy; confidentiality; anonymity; security; freedom from physical or
technological intrusion; freedom from annoyance; freedom from crime; freedom from
embarrassing disclosures; freedom from discrimination; protection of profit; trust; property rights
and commercial rights.12 There is no clear consensus on this issue.
It is interesting that European jurists use more specific language when referring to privacy
issues. Americans use the broad term “privacy” when talking about the need to protect personal
information while Europeans use the terms “data protection”.13 Similarly American law
discusses a women’s “privacy” when talking about the legality of abortions while European
jurists frame the issue as about reproductive rights or human dignity and not “privacy”.14
Thus, American privacy law fits this first characteristic of postmodernism in its lack of
definition and boundaries; it is uncertain. This characteristic exposes the law’s strength; it
covers a variety of concerns that raise general angst in people and legitimate concerns about
safety and security. But it is also, paradoxically, so broad that it is dangerous in its amorphous.
The diversity of definitions heightens the extent to which the laws mislead or confuse citizens
and lawmakers alike. Laws may purport to operate under one definition but, in fact, serve an
entirely different purpose. For example, the Financial Services Modernization Act,15 purports to
protect privacy but, in fact, provides individuals little control over information collected about

12

Fred H. Cate and Litan Robert, "Constitutional Issues in Information Privacy," Michigan Telecommunications and
Technology Law Review 9 (2002): 35.
13
Julia M. Fromholz, "The European Union Data Privacy Directive," Berkeley Technology Law Journal 15 (2000):
461.
14
Edward J. Eberle, "Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitutional Law," Utah
Law Review (1997): 963.
15
GrammLeachBliley Financial Services Modernization Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 68016809 (2000).
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them and exceptions in the law allow for broad violations of privacy. This postmodern trait
exposes the lack of stability and lack of normative power in U.S. Privacy law.
A second characteristic of U.S. privacy law that makes it “postmodern” is it fragmentary
nature. In contrast to the European Unions’ modernist and comprehensive privacy law as
exemplified by the EU Privacy Directive,16 the United States does not have a unified,
"overarching" regime of privacy protection, but rather privacy legislation applicable to different
sectors of government and industries. This patchwork is highly regulatory in some instances,
extremely lax in other areas, and nonexistent in others. The law has specific regulations
restricting activities by the government and has separate regulations covering the private sector.
The government, in a variety of statutes and under the United Sates Constitution, is restricted
from doing things like collecting and maintaining data on U.S. citizens, from excessively
wiretapping phones, and monitoring mail through act such as the Privacy Act of 1974, the
Freedom of Information Act, and tax and census regulations. 17 But, these acts have been
seriously eroded after 9/11 and the security measures implemented by the U.S. Patriot Act18 and
the Computer Assisted Passenger PreScreening System. 19 These regulations are also diminished
by the rise of private sector surveillance and the government’s ready access to this information.
The regulation in the Unites States of data processed by the private sector is especially confusing
and inconsistent, and limited to certain industries. For example, there is specific and fairly
robust legislation for health care data, but inconsistent regulation of financial records and credit
reports, telephone use, cable television, video rentals, children’s Internet use, and motor vehicle
16

Council Directive 95/46 of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281): 31.
17
Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy International. Privacy and Human Rights 2003..
http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/phr2003/. (accessed October 31, 2004).
18
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756 § 203, 115 Stat. 272, 27881 (2001).
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data.20 Outside of these targeted and specifically regulated areas, there is no residual federal
regulation. For example, data collection by Internet companies and many businesses are
completely unregulated or subject to “selfregulation.” In fact, selfregulation or “technological
protections” to safeguard privacy are the Bush administrations’ primary response to privacy
regulation.21
Some states have stepped in to fill some of the gaps but federal preemption has eroded those
efforts.22 The common law provides some protections under tort law. But under the common
law any claim of invasion of privacy has also to be balanced with First Amendment free speech
rights. The collection, exchange, and sale of personal data are protected as a form of commercial
speech under recent cases.23
The fragmented and inconsistent U.S. privacy law has such large gaps, that arguably the law
does not protect privacy at all. Thus, unlike in Europe, there is no requirement for a person’s
consent to the processing, marketing, and sale of personal information. Additionally, you have
no right of access to processed information about you and cannot challenge its accuracy or use
before any court or administrative body. These gaps in U.S. privacy law show that it is more
than merely fragmented; it is arguably broken. One CEO of a large software company summed
the state of privacy protections in the United States by saying “You already have zero privacy 
get over it.”24

19

Computer Assisted Passenger PreScreening System, 49 C.F.R. § 1544.201 (2004).
Electronic Privacy Information Center.
21
Jeffery P. Cunard and Jennifer B. Coplan, "Internet and ECommerce: A Summary of Legal Development,"
Practising Law Institute, Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series. PLI
Order No. G000UG. New York City, November 1415, 2002.
22
California Financial Information Privacy Act, Cal. Fin. Code § 4060 (2004).
23
United Reporting Publ'g Corp. v. California Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 120 S. Ct. 483 (1999).
24
A. Michael Froomkin, "The Death of Privacy?" Stanford Law Review 52 (2000): 1462.
20

American Freedoms, American (Dis)Orders: Proceedings of the Polish Association of
American Studies 2004 Conference

8

The third aspect of U.S. privacy law that makes it postmodern is that it is riddled with
paradox and irony. While many paradoxes could be discussed, this paper identifies nine that
illustrate United States’ privacy law’s postmodern character.
First, many who fear the government’s power to violate people’s privacy rights turn to
the power of the government to protect privacy. These individuals or entities, like the ACLU,
paradoxically simultaneously distrust the government and rely on the government to protect
privacy.
Second, the government is restricted by privacy laws from collecting information about
people’s privacy, but, paradoxically, the government is free to use information garnered by the
private sector for investigative purposes and, since much of the private sector is self or
unregulated, the government has access to this information. In the United States, the police have
few surveillance cameras. The private sector, however, is awash in cameras; every convenience
store, gas station, bank, private individuals, have cameras that scan the public landscape.
Ironically, or rather disconcertingly, police have access to this surveillance.
Third, the dominant fear or paradigm of fear about privacy violations is the specter of
George Orwell’s vision of an allseeing Big Brother.25 For all of the fears of Big Brother raised
by those advocating for stricter privacy laws, the greatest threat to privacy is not from
government but from private companies and individuals that are capturing some much data about
our purchasing and consuming habits. It is not just Big Brother watching you but also Big Sister,
Big Mama, Big Aunt, uncle, cousin.... It is the public (particularly shopkeepers) who are the
surveyors. There is not necessarily the danger of a single, all seeing power as in Orwell’s 1984;
instead, there is the danger of everyone watching everyone else. But the paradox of this lack of
25

George Orwell. 1984. (New York: Signet, reissued 1990). Also available online at: http://www.online
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surveillance regulation is that the gaze on the public also captures the state in acts of
malfeasance. The beating by police of people being arrested such as Rodney King and the
abuses in Iraqi prisons by U.S. soldiers, have come about due to the private surveillance by the
public with their ubiquitous cameras and computers. The fact that cell phones are now coming
with cameras attached, is emblematic of this loss of traditional sense of privacy, but also the
power that individuals have to capture everyday events and spread them across the world in
minutes.
Fourth, a number of conservative judges in the United States have taken paradoxical stances
on some key privacy issues; While conservative judges generally advocate States’ rights and
devolution of federal power; these same judges use the power of the federal courts to preempt
state legislation on privacy issues such as abortion, gay marriage, medical use of marijuana, and
right to die. (But they do not use it to preempt the privacy rights of gun owners.)
Fifth, a number of scholars have observed that privacy law has granted some major advances
for American women in such areas as reproductive rights, but, paradoxically, many women’s
advocates are distrustful of privacy laws because of the fear that the protected privacy will act as
a shield to cover up domination, degradation and abuse of women and others.26
Sixth, privacy laws are engaged in a battle with emerging technologies and it is hard to
envision the battle ever ending. The more regulations that are passed to restrict private data
being collected and transferred, the greater the value of this information and thus, paradoxically,
new, more intrusive means for accessing then develop.

literature.com/orwell/1984/
26
Anita L. Allen, "Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory," University of Cincinnati
Law Review 56 (1987): 470.
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Seventh, selfregulation, which is supposed to limit the intrusion of privacy law, can have the
paradoxical effect of increasing litigation by creating norms and expectations of privacy under
the common law. For example, privacy notices that pop up on Internet web pages arguably
create contractual rights.
Eighth, some privacy law while providing certain privacy protection for citizens, can
paradoxically also provide protections for those who collect data and violate privacy. Loopholes
in legislation provide cover for entities to continue to collect information. Federal law can pre
empt and prevent states from enacting more restrictive policies or prevent states from
experimenting with new privacy laws or regimes.
Ninth, the problem with violations of privacy is not what people end up knowing about you, it
is, paradoxically, what they do not know about you. The type of data that is collected by private
surveyors is problematic because it is fragmentary and incomplete and therefore, misleading. If
there is a record of someone buying beer and cigarettes every week, a person or insurance
company that receives this information does not have an accurate picture of that person; they
might erroneously think he or she is a health risk or have bad habits unless they also know that
this person belongs to a health club or that his or her father smokes and drinks and this person
buys him cigarettes and beers every week.
These paradoxes, identified above, give U.S. privacy law a particular postmodern bent and
expose its lack of clarity.
The fourth characteristic that makes U.S. privacy law “postmodern” is that it emphasizes a
social construction of the self as opposed to the autonomous self. This characteristic is
interesting because many scholars equate the concept of privacy to the concept of self

11
definition.

27

They argue that matters relating to one's innermost self are inherently private.

Privacy is valued because it allows one control over information about oneself, which allows one
to maintain differing degrees of intimacy. It is argued that love, friendship and trust are only
possible if persons enjoy privacy and grant it to one another. Privacy is essential for such
relationships and explains why a threat to privacy is a threat to our very integrity as persons.
Privacy law protects our concept of “self” or our very selves.28
Privacy is also, arguably, culturally relative, contingent on such factors as economics, access
to technology, environmental, and religious practice. For example, concepts of privacy are
likely to be very different on a Kibbutz in Israel or a North American Eskimo community,
particularly compared to people in a town or on a ranch on the plains of Texas.
The question then arises that if privacy is relative or socially constructed and connected to our
construction of our selves; what are the powers that are constructing these norms? If a large
corporation or entity has enough information about our habits and preferences, our likes and
dislikes, (in other words, ourselves), can this information be used to influence these same or
other decisions in the future? What is distressing under American privacy law, is there is a
general wait and see attitude about these pressing questions. On one hand, this “wait and see”
approach allows for great potential advances in efficiencies in the marketplace and in
technological development. Marketing and consumerism can be directly targeted and
exceedingly efficient. But, on the other hand, it also allows for great dangers that threaten our
very selves. It allows for the potential for manipulation at the deepest levels of the lives of
Americans.

27
28

James Rachels,‘Why Privacy is Important,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (1975): 32333
Julie Inness, Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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Another characteristic of postmodernism that aptly fits American privacy law is that it is
politically ambivalent. Privacy laws and regulation are not affiliated with one particular party or
political movement in the United States. Those concerned with privacy in United States, at least
vocally, are not everyday people, but an odd coalition of right and left such as the ACLU and
NRA, gay activists and white supremacists; right to die advocates and librarians. But I find it
distressing that outrage at privacy violations is only being found on the edges of the political
mainstream. Most of the middleoftheroad Americans do not seem particularly concerned with
violations of their privacy. (The exception being outrage at telemarketers; there was strong
public clamoring for restrictions on telemarketers calling people in their homes resulting in the
hightech donot calllist.)
The final two characteristics of postmodernism are selfevident. Much of the current privacy
concerns relate to data stored and information collected by high tech devices and much of the
information is collected in the course of daily consumer transactions. As mentioned earlier, the
shopkeepers are responsible for much of the surveying through high tech tools like computers
and digital cameras. Besides just regulating (or refraining from regulating) technology and daily
consumer activities; the very laws themselves have a high tech bent. Under U.S. privacy law,
consumers may be directed to websites for information, they may file complaints through the
internet, and companies register their privacy policies using web sites set up by these privacy
laws and the Federal Communications Commission.29 But this raises another irony. These very
sites created by privacy law can track and maintain data about your visit to them, creates a
spooky postmodern specter of having more and more data being collected about you and more of

29

Act of Sept. 29, 2003, Pub. L. No. 10882, 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. (117 Stat.) 1006 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
6102 note) (ratifying the authority of the Federal Trade Commission to establish a donotcall registry).
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your privacy violated as you try to learn about our privacy rights or try to lodge a complaint
about privacy violations.
Privacy law’s postmodern character is ultimately problematic and antithetical to laws
regulating functions. In response to the problems raised by the U.S. postmodern privacy law, I
don’t believe, however, one can simply state that the United States should borrow the
comprehensive, modernist, European approach. The lack of a comprehensive regime and this
fragmented and diverse approach is not necessarily something to be reflexively lamenting. It can
be argued that this fragmented or fractured approach is, in fact, appropriate in this evolving and
rapidly changing technological age. The variety and diversity of approaches are, arguably,
appropriate for this hightechnological era. A strong argument can be made that–in light of the
dizzying speed of technological change–the marketplace, custom, and common law (rather than
statutory or other governmental restrictions) should determine how privacy should be protected.
The marketplace fosters innovation and the enormous potential of the technologies might work
best unfettered by privacy regulations. The unregulated, freemarket approach to privacy
protections is arguably another form of “freedom” that is being protected in the United States.
Although at times confusing, the fragmented postmodern tangle of statutory, judicialmade
common law, government regulation, and voluntary custom that makes up privacy law is
possibly what works best to protect “freedom” in a postmodern America. People are being given
as much power to watch their government and regulate the data as the government can. Any
restrictions by privacy law, it is argued, will most likely be done as much to protect government
secrecy as it would be to maintain the American people’s privacy. Indeed, American legal
culture and tradition demonstrates a distrust of laws granting power to the government and
prefers market forces over government regulation.

14
On the other hand, the problem with this freemarket approach is that it has left dangerous
gaping holes in privacy protections under U.S. law. Technological change and fears of terrorism
have aggravated this problem even further. There is the potential of abuse that can ultimately
emerge from the lack of privacy protections engendered by this postmodern, fragmented
approach. The countervailing threat to the freedom of average citizens’ privacy is too great for
the United States not to take a more coherent and comprehensive approach to privacy protections
There are no clear answers to the issues raised in this paper. Privacy law is changing so
rapidly that one clear cut solution is not readily apparent at this time. On balance, the more
modernist and comprehensive European Union approach appears to provide the more “rational”
and modern solution, and therefore is the more desirable option as a workable legal norm. The
dangers of privacy abuse are too great to leave this power unregulated and in a postmodern state
of flux. Postmodernism is often labeled as “dangerous”. 30 The American postmodern approach
to regulating privacy can also be aptly labeled “dangerous” because of the potential evisceration
of our current notions of privacy and what is needed to protect them. A more comprehensive,
modern approach, while possibly more stifling or even ineffective, can, as some scholars have
argued, “buy us time” to sort out the most effective manner to determine and regulate our
privacy needs. 31 A more modern approach would, at least temporarily, give us a sense of
security, privacy, and ourselves.

30
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